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Abstract 
Large scale failures or degradation resulting from smaller initial failures or disruptions in networked system-of-
systems are an issue in multiple areas - for example cascading failures in electrical power grids or large disruptions in 
national air traffic due to local or regional weather conditions. The system architecture can have a significant impact 
on system-of-systems susceptibility to large scale failures.  
The study presented in this paper uses a simple interdependent networked system-of-systems failure model, 
integrated into a unique objective function that addresses both the overall level of failure and the rate of failure 
progression, and a genetic algorithm to demonstrate an integrated failure modeling based optimization method to 
select system-of-systems architectures for improved resiliency. 
The results for the integrated failure model/genetic algorithm model results converged rapidly to a steady state 
values. This initial integration shows a possible path forward to more sophisticated model integration and optimization 
and demonstrates a basic level of feasibility for this general approach. 
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1. Introduction
Various network architectures, for example grid networks, random networks or intermediate forms such as small 
world networks, display characteristic resiliency or vulnerability to different failure or attack types. Interconnected 
and interdependent networks can display additional vulnerabilities to spreading or cascading failures. Evaluating 
network based architectures for robustness or resiliency against a range of failure scenarios can be an important aspect 
of selecting network characteristics. 
The study presented in this paper uses a simple interdependent networked system-of-systems model integrated into 
a simple but appropriate objective functions to explore the use of a genetic algorithm based method to select system-
of-systems architectures for improved resiliency.  
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes a survey research on large failures in networked systems 
and on optimizing network architectures to improve resiliency. Section 3 describes the integrated analysis model 
developed for this study. Section 4 describes the results and Section 5 describes conclusions drawn from this approach. 
2. Analyzing Failures Cascades and  Improving Networked System Resilience
2.1. Analyzing Failures Cascades 
The last several decades has seen progress in research on large cascading type failures in complex networks. 
Research on the structure or architecture of networked systems, with a focus on the nodes and their connectivity to 
other nodes as the key architectural aspects has yielded a range of very useful insights into how these aspects influence 
system susceptibility to large failures and the potential for system-wide failure cascades. This research has focused on 
both failures, which are non-intentional and may be expected to have a random initiation and attacks which may 
intentionally target critical nodes. 
Random graph type networks without much clustering have been found to be generally resilient with respect to 
random failures in the form of removal of random nodes or edges. Network topologies with significant hub nodes, i.e. 
nodes with very high numbers of connections, including small world networks or scale-free networks with a power 
law degree distribution may exhibit high performance in the form of short overall paths between nodes but may also 
be susceptible to major failures when the highly connected hub nodes are removed1, 2. 
With even a few highly connected hubs active these power law type networks can still provide a high degree of 
connectivity and functionality. The internet is an example of this seemingly fragile but nevertheless quite robust type 
of topography/degree distribution 3. 
Real world networked systems, such as the US power grid have connectivity distributions or degree distributions 
similar to a scale free network degree distribution. Modelling the load redistribution seen in real world networks in 
response to failures resulted in wide spread failure cascades in models of this network 4. 
System node and edge or link loading emerge as a major contributor to failure cascades. A relationship between 
highly linked nodes and highly loaded nodes and links can contribute to failure cascades due to the loss of these key 
nodes or links, making them the potential focus of an attacker trying to cause a larger failure cascade5. 
A mitigation to many network vulnerabilities is the addition of links and connectivity to provide more connections 
and load paths. This number of links and the number of connections a given node can support though is limited by the 
very real world limits of cost. Additionally, real world geographic and other constraints will limit connectivity options, 
thus these are also important aspects in modelling and optimizing networks for resilience5.  
Refinements to load based network failure analyses have include the addition of load margins and intermediate or 
degraded states as opposed to binary failed/non-failed states which introduce the potential for congested nodes and 
reduced efficiency edges and links to the network system failure state6. 
The perspective of the impact of system loading on the likelihood of failure cascades has led to the potential that 
large systems self-organize to operate near critical points where large failures become increasingly likely. Several 
studies develop very plausible arguments that economic, technical and societal drivers result in many large networked 
systems evolving or self-organizing to operate at near critical load levels7, 8. 
The study of interdependent or interacting networks has been an expansion of the analysis of complex networked 
systems-of-systems reflecting the real world dependencies between such networked systems as power grids and 
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communications networks. These analysis have demonstrated the potential for greater probability of failure cascades 
due to the interdependences. Significant vulnerabilities such as a minimum critical failure or attach size, above which 
complete network collapse may occur have been demonstrated in models of these interconnected systems. These 
vulnerabilities are enabled in part by the spatially embedded nature or geographically limitations of the network 
topologies for these types of systems 9, 10, 11, 12, 13. 
2.2. Approaches to  Improving Networked System Resilience 
A number of studies have focused on ways to optimize network architectures for resilience in the face of various 
failure or attach types and within cost or resource limitations. 
One approach used parameterized growth and node connectedness to develop family of network types which 
included variants that had the resistance to a directed attack similar to a random graph type network and resilience 
against random failures of a small-world type network. This study used the network’s average shortest path between 
two nodes as the measure of the network’s resilience to attack14. 
Using a similar approach while keeping network costs, related to number of links/proportional to the average degree
of the network, constant, several studies developed optimization strategies for a number of network types for both 
failures and attacks and combinations/waves of failures and attacks. These studies use the ‘critical fraction’ or number 
of failures required to disconnect the network as the driving figure of merit. A major conclusion from these studies 
was that a bi-modal network distribution, where there is a large fraction of low degree nodes, a smaller fraction of 
highly connected hub nodes and where the hub nodes are highly connected with each other provides a near optimum 
configuration for resilience against both random failures and directed attacks15, 16, 17. 
Another study also addressed optimizing network structure to deal with both random and targeted attacks, 
highlighting the importance of the minimum degree of the network as a factor in robustness. This study also discussed 
the role of evolutionary pressures in driving network development down non-robust paths18. 
Another approach addressed the need to make existing networks more robust. This study used a method of 
modifying an existing network structure with the addition of edges or the re-wiring of existing edges. They used the 
largest connected network element and the shortest average path length as their robustness figures of merit. They tried 
a number of strategies with node degree typically be the key variable. This approach showed significantly improved 
robustness against low levels of attack for a low level of changes and significantly higher levels of change required to 
improve performance against higher levels of attack. Their method also considered network integrity during the 
rewiring process itself 19. 
Re-wiring was also used as a trial step in a study that optimized network architectures using a simulated annealing 
process. This study also introduced a concept of “entangled network” structures characterized by homogeneous node 
degrees and highly interwoven connections. This study also highlighted the role of network synchronizability, 
especially in the case of process networks and the relationship between synchronizability and node degree 
homogeneity20. 
Several studies used a genetic algorithm, operating with an elemental node connectivity repair functions (add, 
remove or exchange links) on a node-to-node adjacency matrix to optimize a network for resiliency. These studies 
used stochastic approaches to quantify the network robustness, in one resiliency was measured by the probability that 
the network is in a state with all nodes connected, in the other an estimate of traffic efficiency was used21, 22. 
Another approach explored the optimization of the robustness scale free networks with respect to random failures 
by maximizing the entropy of the network degree distribution23. 
One study used a very unique biologically inspired approach. This study used rules developed from slime mold 
networks as applied to a complex rail network problem and showed potentially increased network robustness. The 
study used mathematical modeling as well as an actual slime mold network developed using food sources at population 
centers and illumination on no-traverse regions to grow the network along the demographic and geographic constraints 
of the rail system under study 24. 
The following section describes the approach used in the current study which uses a genetic algorithm to explore 
optimizing aspects of a system of system consisting of two interdependent networks. 
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3. A Genetic Algorithm Based Approach to Optimizing Interdependent Network Characteristics for
Resilience. 
The study reported on in this paper develops a demonstration of concept for a method to use a genetic algorithm to 
optimize basic network architecture characteristic for resilience or robustness. The approach used here builds on a 
simple model of two interdependent networks and their response to an initial failure condition. For a given set of 
network architecture characteristics (selected by the genetic algorithm) the failure cascades experienced by the two 
networks response are evaluated for a range of initial failure sizes and locations. This model is described in the 
following sections and in greater detail in a study on network characteristics effects on failure propagation 25.
Figure 1 illustrates the integrated flow from the network failure model through the genetic algorithm and the 
integration of the interdependent network failure model to provide the objective function with each data/process flow 
diagram being embedded in the higher level flow to its left. 
Figure 1 Genetic Algorithm with Dual Interdependent Network Failure Model Based Objective Function
The following subsections describe the three major components of the integrated the core interdependent network 
model, how that model is used to provide a robustness objective function and the genetic algorithm used to optimize 
the network architecture characteristics. 
3.1. The Complex Networked Systems-of-Systems Failure Model 
The basic system-of-system was modeled using two interacting grid networks as shown in equation 1. The 
modeling system used was MATLAB. The system-of-system model consisted of two 2500 node grid networks.
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The node failure modelling generally followed the inter-network failure modelling of the studies on spatially 
embedded network9, 10, 11, 12, 13. The basic node state model was a binary active/failed model as shown in equation 2. 
inactiveor  failed   node 0.   
active node 1,)(
n ym, at x  i) network(in     node : )(
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inode
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(2) 
The nodes dependency on nodes in the other network was a simple fail if dependent on node that fails model as 
shown in equation 3. No within-network dependencies were used in this study.
Nodes in network (i) were dependent on nodes in network(j) and nodes in network (j) were dependent on nodes in 
network(i) but these dependencies were not symmetric, i.e. node (i)mn dependency on node (j)pq did not imply the 
converse of node(j)pq dependency on node(i)mn, rather the node dependencies for each network were chosen randomly 
within the constraints of the network dependency and active population parameters. The network dependency 
parameters and the active population parameter to be defined by the genetic algorithm, chromosome were as defined 
in equation 4     
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The initial network damage region (within which all nodes in network (i) were set to inactive) was as defined as in 
equation 5, where the damage radius was one of the parameters under study for a given run and the center point was 
randomly chosen for each run. 
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The right most data flow diagram in Figure 1 illustrates the overall sequence of the basic system-of-systems model: 
The network’s characteristics were defined, network dependencies were defined with random dependency 
assignments within the limits of the parameters chosen by the genetic algorithm, a failure location was randomly 
chosen and the current network run’s failure size was applied to fail all of the nodes for 1st network within the specified 
size, then 15 failure iterations were run, in which inter-network dependencies resulted in additional failures on each 
network, to complete a distinct (i.e. a given set of parameter values and a given initial failure size and location) network 
run. 10 of these distinct network runs, each with a different starting failure center point were completed to characterize 
the failure response for a given set of network parameter values and a given failure size 
3.2. The Model Developed into a Robustness Objective Function 
The robustness of a given network configuration with respect to a given initial failure condition could be gauged 
by two related measures – the final extent of the fully developed failure region (after 15 complete failure iterations) 
and the speed, in terms of failure extent per failure iteration, at which the failure cascade developed. Two runs could 
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have a similar final failure extent, but if one reached that final failure extent many iterations sooner than the other, 
then the failure cascade was potentially more abrupt and, in an important sense, worse for that run. 
The objective function used for the genetic algorithm was a chosen to measure both of these criteria; final failure 
extent and speed of failure progression. The center data flow diagram in Figure 1 illustrates the use of the basic system-
of-systems model to provide the objective function for the genetic algorithm; The basic model – with 15 failure 
iterations for a given starting failure and 10 overall iterations with different failure starting locations for each input 
failure size and set of network parameters was run for three different failure sizes for the set of genetic algorithm 
selected network characteristics. The mean of the number of failed nodes over these 450 iterations (3 starting failure 
sizes x 10 network runs with different failure starting locations x 15 failure iterations to allow each failure progression 
to develop) was used as the objective function, with a lower value (lower failures) being better.  
3.3. Implementation of the Genetic Algorithm 
The left most data flow diagram in Figure 1 illustrates the genetic algorithm with the basic system-of-systems 
model based objective function as the inner loop. The genetic algorithm attributes included a population size of 20, a 
generation run of 15 generations, a reproduction fraction (number of genes for the non-dominant chromosomes 
potentially exchanged with genes from the dominant chromosome each generation) of 35% and a mutation fraction 
(number of genes subject to potential random changes each generation of 35%.  The best chromosome for each 
generation was passed unchanged to the next generation. 
The chromosome for each population member was a binary vector encoding the three architectural parameters to 
be optimized for as follows: The chromosome is a 22 bit string consisting of 3 genes (one corresponding to each of 
high level design variables): 
1.) Dependency radius: 5 bits giving a dependency span or distance of up to span of 31 out of the grid 50 unit 
span. 
2.) Dependency density: 5 bits - a value of up to 31, divided by 31 to give the fraction of nodes dependent on 
nodes in the other grid – e.g. a value of 31 results in a dependency density of 1.0 – all nodes are dependent 
on nodes in the other grid. 
3.) Active Node fraction: 12 bits – fraction of initially active nodes out of 2500 (an active node fraction of 
greater than 2500 is set equal to 2500). 
4. Results
Preliminary runs of the integrated failure model/genetic algorithm analysis had shown a fair amount of ‘noise’ or 
variability in the objective function fitness value output due to the random selection of specific initial failure locations 
and of node dependency relationships. The resetting of the random number generator to a common seed at the start of 
each run through the objective function removed this source of variability and resulted in significantly more 
deterministic results. The analysis was run both with this reset of the random number generator (‘Repeatable Objective 
Function’) and without this reset (‘Variable Objective Function’).  
The evolution of the three genes for both repeatable and variable objective functions is shown in the top three 
graphs in figure 2. The genes for the repeatable objective function runs show rapid and stable convergence to steady
state values. The variable objective function genes take longer to converge and exhibit oscillatory type behavior but 
do settle down in ranges comparable to those of the repeatable objective functions. The values for the genes for the 
repeatable objective function case converged on values giving a medium dependency radius value of 6 nodes (a node 
could be dependent on nodes in the other grid within the 12% of the network spans), a low node dependency density 
value – only about 10% of the nodes were dependent on nodes in the other gird and a medium active node density 
fraction – 50% of the potential node sites were active in the networks 
The evolution of the objective function’s best fitness value per generation for the repeatable and variable objective 
functions is shown as the lower graph in figure 2. The repeatable objective function values converged rapidly to a 
steady state value. The variable objective function value exhibit some oscillation like behavior but also show a 
convergence to a range similar to that of the repeatable objective function.  
. 
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Figure 2 Evolution of Genes and Fitness Value (lower is better) for Repeatable and Variable Objective Functions
5. Conclusions and Next Steps
These initial models were fairly simple and did not include major aspects of common network architectures and
network failure mechanism modeling.  The basic failure model does exhibit a cascading type failure progression and 
this key aspect coupled with the simplicity of the model made it a good candidate for the base model for the objective 
function for this demonstration of concept. The integration of this model with genetic algorithm was successful in 
selecting simple network architecture parameters that reduced the overall failure rate as measured by the evolution of 
the fitness values as determined by the objective function.  
This approach of integrating a failure model and testing the model over a range of failure conditions to provide an 
objective model that provides a measure of resiliency for a genetic algorithm based optimization shows promise for 
further development. The modularity of the approach and the generic nature of the objective function also provide a 
fairly straightforward means to integrate more sophisticated failure models and more realistic system-of-system 
models.  
The objective function approach taken, using the mean number of failed nodes over multiple failure iterations and 
starting failure conditions as a measure of both the overall extent of the failure and the speed of progression of the 
failure also seems to show promise.  
As a demonstration of concept this study demonstrates a possible path and a basic level of feasibility for applying 
genetic algorithms to improving system-of-system architectures for robustness and resiliency. 
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